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I. INTRODUCTION
Appellate practice in international arbitration presents a paradox. It is,
at once, an accepted practice and a forbidden system. The status it holds de-
pends on the forum in which the parties find themselves, and the type of dis-
pute they seek to resolve. Commodity trade associations provide for arbitral
appellate processes, and on a much grander scale, international trade dis-
putes are regularly reviewed by the World Trade Organization's ("WTO")
internal Appellate Body. Commercial disputes in France, Belgium and
South Africa are eligible for institutional appeal and the incorporation of an
appellate mechanism is currently under review for some bilateral investment
treaties (BITs) and multilateral investment treaties (MITs). However, most
parties to international commercial and investor-state arbitration have no op-
portunity to appeal arbitral awards.
The past decade saw a dramatic upsurge in the adoption of BITs and
MITs. At the close of the 1980s, there were 385 BITs in existence;' by the
end of 2004, over 2,000 had been embraced. As a result, the number of in-
ternational investment disputes also increased. 3 Claims filed before the In-
ternational Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) have in-
creased exponentially.4 From its creation in 1965 through 2002, ICSID
registered 85 investor-state disputes and 10 Additional Facility cases.5
6Since 2002, ICSID's case load has nearly doubled.
Parties are increasingly considering the inclusion of an appellate mecha-
nism within BITs and MITs, as evidenced by some of the more recent trea-
ties.7 However, neither ICSID nor most other institutional providers of in-
ternational arbitration have adopted rules relating to appellate processes in
international investment dispute arbitration. Despite some discussion to
1 United Nations Conference on Trade and Dev. (UNCTAD), Bilateral Investment Treaties 1959-
1999 (2000).
2 International Institute for Sustainable Development, Investment and Sustainable Development, A
Guide to the Use and Potential of International Investment Agreements (2004).
3 International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes, Possible Improvements for the Frame-
work of ICSID Arbitration, ICSID Secretariat Discussion Paper (October 22, 2004).4 id.
5 Id.
61id.
7 See, e.g., Jack J. Coe, Jr., The State of Investor-State Arbitration--Some Reflections on Professor
Brower's Plea for Sensible Principles, 20 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 929, 950-51 (2005) ("[T]he United
States has agreed respectively with Singapore, Chile and its CAFTA counterparts that by dates cer-
tain, establishment of an appellate mechanism will at least be given consideration.").
8 See United Nations Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law [UNCITRAL] Arbitration Rules, art. 32.2 ("The
award shall be made in writing and shall be final and binding on the parties. The parties undertake to
carry out the award without delay."); London Court of Int'l Arbitration [LCIA] Arbitration Rules,
2
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include an appellate process within the ICSID and UNCITRAL Rules, 9 no
such procedure has been adopted to date.
Further, while some review mechanisms have been instituted in interna-
tional commercial arbitration, there are only limited provisions for appellate
review of these awards. For example, the International Chamber of Com-
merce, Judicial Arbitration & Mediation Services, Inc. (JAMS) and the
China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission require
that arbitral tribunals submit draft awards to review committees for scru-
tiny. 10 As shall be discussed, these requirements should not supplant an ap-
pellate process.
The absence of arbitral appeals processes adversely impacts the legiti-
macy of international arbitration. As the frequency of cross-border transac-
art. 26.9 ("All awards shall be final and binding on the parties. By agreeing to arbitration under these
Rules, the parties undertake to carry out any award immediately and without any delay (subject only
to art. 27); and the parties also waive irrevocably their right to any form of appeal, review or re-
course to any state court or other judicial authority, insofar as such waiver may be validly made.");
China Int'l Econ. and Trade Arbitration Comm'n [CIETAC], Arbitration Rules, art. 43.8 ("The arbi-
tral award is final and binding upon both parties. Neither party may bring a suit before a law court
or make a request to any other organization for revising the award."); Am. Arbitration Ass'n [AAA],
International Arbitration Rules, art. 27.1 ("Awards shall be made in writing, promptly by the tribu-
nal, and shall be final and binding on the parties."); Mexico City Nat'l Chamber Of Commerce
[CANACO], Arbitration Rules, art. 39.2 ("The award shall be issued in writing and shall be final and
binding upon the parties.); Austl. Ctr. for Int'l Commercial Arbitration [ACICA], Arbitration Rules,
Section V, art. 43.3 ("To the extent permitted by the law of the seat of the arbitration, the parties
shall be taken to have waived any right of appeal or review in respect of any such decisions made by
ACICA to any State court or otherjudicial authority.").
9 Eric van Ginkel, Reframing the Dilemma of Contractually Expanded Judicial Review: Arbitral Ap-
peal vs. Vacatur, 3 PEPP. DIsP. RESOL. L.J. 157, 203 (2003) ("Notably, the delegation for the United
Kingdom pointed out that '[w]hilst thoroughly understanding the point of view that the parties
should not be compelled to submit to recourse on questions of law, the United Kingdom suggests
that the logical consequence of party autonomy is that they should be allowed to have recourse, if
that is what they have agreed."' (quoting F. Davidson, The New Arbitration Act - A Model Law?,
1997 J. Bus. L. 101,125)).
10 ICC, Rules of Arbitration, art. 27, available at http://www.iccwbo.org/
court/english/arbitration/rules.asp (last visited Mar. 29, 2007) (hereinafter ICC), provides for scru-
tiny of the Award by the Court (emphasis added). See also CIETAC Arbitration Rules, art. 45,
available at http://www.cietac.org.cn/english/rules/rules.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2007) (hereinafter
CIETAC), which states that "[t]he arbitral tribunal shall submit its draft award to the CIETAC for
scrutiny before signing the award. The CIETAC may remind the arbitral tribunal of issues in the
award on condition that the arbitral tribunal's independence in rendering the award is not affected.").
See also JAMS International Arbitration Rules, art. 32.3, available at http://www.jamsadr.com/
rules/international -arbitration rules.asp (last visited Mar. 29, 2007) (hereinafter JAMS International
Arbitration Rules), which provides that, "Before signing any Award, the Tribunal will submit it in
draft to JAMS. JAMS may suggest modifications as to the form of the Award and may also draw
the Tribunal's attention to points of substance. No Award will be rendered by the Tribunal until it
has been approved by JAMS as to its form."
271
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tions continues to increase, parties have evidenced a need for meaningful re-
view of arbitral awards.l' Many of the disputes arising from these transac-
tions present stakes too high to forbid opportunities for correction of flawed
results. 1 Indeed, in a "survey of 606 corporate lawyers from America's
largest corporations, 54.3% of those who chose not to opt for arbitration said
that choice was made largely because arbitration awards are so difficult to
appeal." 
13
The lack of an appellate process has also resulted in a lack of public
confidence in international arbitral systems. The potential for inconsistent
awards in investor-state disputes, for example, may also "affect foreign in-
vestment decisions, economic development and foreign relations. For in-
vestors, this means investment uncertainty.
This article will explore the advantages of instituting appellate mecha-
nisms in investor-state disputes and international commercial arbitration.
Part II begins with a review of the WTO Appellate Body's development and
workings, followed by an analysis of other appellate procedures for interna-
tional trade law arbitration, including the MERCOSUR system's Permanent
Court and the Grain and Feed Trade Association's appeals process. These
examples demonstrate successful appeals processes within the international
realm, which can serve as models for investor-state and international com-
mercial arbitration appeals. Part III examines the current methods for re-
viewing investor-state arbitration awards under ICSID and NAFTA. Neither
system provides an effective method for appealing arbitral awards. The lack
of such a structure has a deleterious effect on the development of a reliable
and consistent body of law in this area. Part III goes on to advocate for the
creation of an Appeals Facility, separate from current arbitral institutions,
which would be empowered to hear appeals in investor-state arbitrations.
Part IV studies the lack of appellate practice within international commercial
arbitration. This section examines current domestic appeals processes
within the US and institutional scrutiny of awards. After analyzing exam-
ples of Austrian, South African and French institutional appellate proce-
" William H. Knull, III & Noah D. Rubins, Betting the Farm on International Arbitration: Is it Time
to Offer an Appeal Option?, I I AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 531, 531 (2000).
12 Id. at 532.
13 See CHRISTIAN BCTHRING-UHLE, ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS,
404 (1996) ("The study revealed that of twelve potential barriers to choosing arbitration, corporate
counsel named only the unwillingness of the other party to agree to ADR as more significant than
the lack of appeal. In another study that polled about fifty American and European lawyers, arbitra-
tion commentators, and corporate executives, about one-third stated that the absence of appeal was
not an advantage to arbitration, while another third declared that this was a 'highly relevant' advan-
tage to private dispute resolution.").
14 Susan D. Franck, The Nature and Enforcement of Investor Rights Under Investment Treaties: Do
Investment Treaties Have a Bright Future, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 47, 57 (2005).
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dures, Part IV argues that the lack of these processes in other jurisdictions
must be remedied in the interests of efficiency and party autonomy. Part V
concludes that parties should be permitted to participate in appellate review
of arbitral awards, if they so choose.
II. INTERNATIONAL TRADE APPEALS PROCESSES
Appellate review of international trade disputes is well established. Not
only has the WTO Appellate Body been in existence for more than a decade,
but smaller trade organizations have also provided appeals of arbitration
awards. ' 5 Further, the Southern Common Market, or MERCOSUR, has also
incoTorated an optional appeals court within its dispute resolution proce-
dure. 6 This section reviews how these systems have been implemented and
analyzes their effectiveness in providing for a consistent and reliable body of
trade law. This discussion shall inform the need for a formal appellate re-
view procedure within other areas of international arbitration.
WTO Appellate Body
In February 1995, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body ("DSB") provided
for the creation of an Appellate Body, a Rermanent international tribunal
which hears appeals of WTO panel reports. It is comprised of seven mem-
bers; three members are assigned to hear each appeal, on rotation.18 To en-
sure for a reliable appellate process, members are required to discuss each
case with the other members of the Appellate Body, who were not selected
to hear the appeal. ' 9 An award is only rendered after this exchange.2 °
'5 WTO, UNDERSTANDING ON RULES AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
(DSU), art. 17 (1995).
16 UNCTAD, COURSE ON DISPUTE SETTLEMENT ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE, INVESTMENT AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, REGIONAL APPROACHES, MERCOSUR, at 20, available at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/edmmisc232add28-en.pdf at 27 (last visited Mar. 29, 2007).
17See WTO, Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (herein-
after DSU), art. 17 (1995) (The WTO dispute settlement system has jurisdiction over any dispute
between WTO Members arising under the WTO agreements contained within Appendix I to the
DSU, including the WTO Agreement, the GATT 1994 and all other Multilateral Agreements on
Trade in Goods, the GATS, the TRIPS Agreement and the DSU.); see also UNCTAD, Course on
Dispute Settlement, WTO, Module 3.1, Overview (2003), http://www.unctad.org/
en/docs/edmmisc232addl ILen.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2007).
18 WTO, Working Procedures for Appellate Review, Rule 6(1).
'9 Id. Rule 4(3) states, "Each Member shall receive all documents filed in an appeal. A Member,
who has a conflict of interest, shall not take part in the exchange of views."
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In the past decade of its operation, the Appellate Body has demonstrated
that the appeals processes need not invite: (1) undue delays to the dispute
resolution process, (2) increased costs for parties, or (3) an unmanageable• • • 21
caseload for the institution. The WTO estimates that its dispute settlement
process usually takes one year when a case is not appealed; appeals take an
additional three months. The timetable for general appeals provides that,
after a notice of appeal has been filed, parties have twenty-five days to make
all submissions. Oral hearings are held ten days later, and can last for up
to ten days. 24 Thereafter, the Appellate Body Report is circulated to WTO
members within ninety days of the date when the Notice of Appeal was
filed.25 The Appellate Body's decision becomes public immediately, upon
circulation. 26 Keeping the arbitral process to such a relatively short period
of time protects parties from the cost and time involved in prolonged litiga-
tion.
Whereas, in 1996 and 1997, one hundred percent of the panel reports
were appealed, the rate of disputes appealed had dropped to sixty percent by
2005. This implies that the workings of the Appellate Body have provided
for some predictability in the dispute settlement process; such predictability
can be relied upon by governments to anticipate the consequence of an ap-
peal.2 8 Moreover, the Appellate Body's reliance on prior cases, while not
binding and not necessarily conclusive, has provided "a degree of consis-
tency which, in turn, enhances the predictability of the whole system." 29 In
"establishing an institution that can uphold the rules of world trade", the
WTO Appellate Body has "furthered the cause of lowering barriers to trade
in the world and maintaining security, predictability, and stability in the
20 See UNCTAD, Course on Dispute Settlement, WTO, Module 3.3 Appellate Review, 7 (2003), at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/edmmisc232add I 7en.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2007).
21 WTO, Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes, at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/tif e/displ-e.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2007).
2 2 /d.
23 WTO, supra note 18, Rules 20; 21(I); 22, 23(I), (3), (4); 24(1), and (2).
24 Id. at Rule 27.
25 DSU, supra note 17, art. 17:5.
26 id.
27 WTO, APPELLATE BODY ANNUAL REPORT (2005), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispue/statse.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2007).
28 WTO, Report by the Consultative Board to the former Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi,
The WTO Dispute Settlement System, (2005) http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/
I Oannive/future-wto-chap6e.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2007). Others, however, suggest that re-
ports of the Appellate Body in recent years have often been "essentially unreadable." Peter Van den
Bossche, Debating The Future Of The World Trade Organization: Divergent Views On The 2005
Sutherland Report, 8 J. INT'L ECON. L. 759, 765 (2005) ("[U]nlike reports from the first few years of
the Appellate Body, [recent reports] read as if they were largely written by the Secretariat with only
the key findings formulated by the Appellate Body Members themselves.").
29Van den Bosshe, supra note 28, at 765.
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world trading system." 30 In such a setting, parties are well informed as to
the workings of the Appellate Body and in a better position to decide
whether to file an appeal.
Other Trade Related Arbitral Appeal Procedures
Appellate systems, similar to the WTO Appellate Body, have been de-
veloped under the auspices of other trade related institutions. For example,
the Southern Common Market, or MERCOSUR, recently established a Per-
manent Court of Review ("Permanent Court") to hear arbitral appeals.3 1
MERCOSUR was formed by the Treaty of Asuncion between Brazil, Argen-
tina, Uruguay and Paraguay and was entered into force in 1991.32 The objec-
tive in establishing MERCOSUR was to form a common market and found a
dispute settlement system for member countries. 33 Further clarifying the
availability of MERCOSUR dispute settlement, the Olivos Protocol for the
Settlement of Disputes in MERCOSUR was entered into force in 2004.34
The Olivos Protocol modified MERCOSUR's dispute settlement system
to enhance the predictability of the system. 35 Accordingly, the Olivos Pro-
tocol provides a three-tier dispute settlement system, which includes (1) di-
rect negotiations, (2) ad hoc arbitration, and (3) appeals before the Perma-
nent Court. 36 The Permanent Court may be comprised of three or five
arbitrators, dependent on the number of MERCOSUR States involved in the
arbitration.37 Appeals are limited to legal issues of the dispute and to the le-
30 Proceedings of the Ninety-Ninth Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law,
New World Order or a World in Disorder? Testing the Limits of International Law, WTO Appellate
Body Roundtable, 99 AM. SOCY INT'L L. PROC. 175, 179 (2005).
31 UNCTAD, supra, note 16.
32 id.
33 UNCTAD, supra note 16, at 8 (last visited Mar. 29, 2007). The institutional structure of
MERCOSUR was set up in 1994 by The Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Asuncion on the Insti-
tutional Structure of MERCOSUR, or the Protocol of Ouro Preto. Id. at 12. This established
MERCOSUR as an international organization. Id. However, as none of its founding Member States
chose to transfer their sovereignty to MERCOSUR, it holds no supranational authority. Id. at 13.
See also Treaty of Asuncion, Annex III (1991).
34 UNCTAD, supra note 16, at 24.
" Id. at 26.
36 Michael Cornell Dypski, An Examination Of Investor-State Dispute Resolution Under The Merco-
sur And NAFTA Regimes, 8-SPG L. & Bus. REV. AM. 217, 227-28 (2005).
37 UNCTAD, supra note 16, at 36.
275
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gal interpretations in the underlying award. 38 The Permanent Court's deci-
sions are final.39
The MERCOSUR dispute settlement system has not yet been widely
used. 40  In practice, disputes have been settled through direct negotiations
between state officials.. Appeals procedures are, however, readily utilized
within commodity trade arbitration. 42 Here, trade associations provide for
review of arbitral awards through institutional appellate processes. 43  The
Grain and Feed Trade Association (GAFTA), for example, offers arbitration
services for contractual disputes which incorporate the GAFTA Arbitration
Rules.44 These rules provide a rather extensive explanation of parties' right
to appeal,45 the constitution of a board of appeal, the appeals procedure,47
48 49 50
appeals on string contracts, withdrawal of appeals and appeal awards.
GAFTA arbitration awards may be appealed by either party within thirty
days after an award has been rendered; if both parties appeal the award,
they may be consolidated for hearing by the same board of appeal.5 2 Where
the first award was made by a sole arbitrator, the board of appeal will in-
clude three members; 53 where the first award was issued by a tribunal of
three arbitrators, the board of appeal shall be comprised of five members.54
Here, appeals involve a new hearing of the dispute wherein the board of ap-
peal is empowered to: (a) vary an award by increasing or reducing the liabil-
ity of either party, (b) correct any errors in the award or otherwise alter or
38 ASIL, International Law in Brief Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR): Protocol of Olivos




41 See, e.g. Dypski, supra note 36, at 228 n. 61.
42 Knull, supra note 11, at 557.
43 Id., stating: "Many of these commodity arbitration rule systems include separate, default proce-
dures for appeal. Appeal is commonly heard by a panel or board with five members, drawn from a
list of approved arbitrators maintained by each trade association. As a rule, appeals board members
are senior practitioners in the trade with experience in arbitrating complex disputes." See also infra
note 44 at Rule 10; COFFEE TRADE FEDERATION ARBITRATION RULES, RULE 40; LONDON RICE
BROKERS' ASSOCIATION ARBITRATION RULES, RULE 111.
" See The Grain and Feed Ass'n [GAFTA], Arbitration Rules No. 125 (2003), available at
http://www.medimedica.com/Contratti%20tipo/125.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2007).
45Id. at Rule 10.
46 Id. at Rule 11.
41Id. at Rule 12.
8Id. at Rule 14.
9Id. at Rule 13.
50 GAFTA, supra note 44, at Rule 15.
I' d. at Rule 10.1.
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amend it, (c) award the payment of interest, (d) award the payment of costs,
fees and expenses of and incidental to the hearing of the arbitration and the
appeal. 55 The board of appeal's award is final and binding on the parties.
56
This review process is also conducted in a cost efficient and timely
manner; GAFTA estimates that awards will be published within six months
of receipt of parties' first submissions. 57 The finality of the arbitral Frocess
is preserved as awards of the board of appeals are final and binding.5 Thus,
GAFTA is able to provide disputants with an effective means for ensuring
the issuance of accurate awards and to recognize parties' interests in design-
ing an arbitration process to fit their needs.
Advantages of International Trade Appellate Processes
The rationale for instituting appellate review for international trade arbi-
tration awards was due to parties' desire for certainty within the arbitral
process and consistency as the law developed. 59 Each of the provisions for
such review, discussed above, allow for institutional review of awards.
These systems have proven to be timely and cost-effective means for provid-
ing parties with the option for appeal.
As discussed below, the advantages in providing for institutional review
of arbitral awards far outweighs current review processes. The lessons
learned by the implementation of appellate review of international trade dis-
putes should be applied to investor-state and international commercial arbi-
tration. The appellate mechanisms available for international trade arbitra-
tion show that appellate processes in international arbitration are not only
preferable to seeking judicial remedies, but they are desired by parties as an
efficient and cost-effective means for ensuring reasoned awards.
III. THE CASE FOR ARBITRAL APPEALS IN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION
When international trade arbitration awards are dubious, parties can turn
to the appellate vehicle available to them for review of said award. But in
investor-state disputes, parties who wish to challenge an award "end up in a
55 Id. at Rule 12.4.
56 GAFTA, supra note 44, at Rule 12.6.
" Id. at Rule 4.6.
58 Id. at Rule 12.6.
5' Knull, supra note 11, at 550.
9
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diffuse system of contract and treaty arbitration." 60 Both the Convention on
the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of
Other States (Washington Convention) and the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) leave parties with few options for reviewing legally
• ~61 ..
deficient awards. To cure this deficiency, a cohesive and independent Ap-
peals Facility must be established for review of investor-State arbitration
awards.
ICSID
As discussed below, the inadequacy of the recourse provided by ICSID
arbitration is increasingly apparent. In lieu of an appellate procedure, the
Washington Convention, which created the ICSID system for settling in-
vestment disputes between host States and investors, provides an annulment
process for arbitrations conducted pursuant to ICSID Rules of Procedure for
Arbitration Proceedings (ICSID Arbitration Rules). 62 Requests for annul-
ment must be based on a party's assertion that
(a) that the Tribunal was not properly constituted; (b) that the Tribunal
has manifestly exceeded its powers; (c) that there was corruption on the part
of a member of the Tribunal; (d) that there has been a serious departure from
a fundamental rule of procedure; or (e) that the award has failed to state the
reasons on which it is based.63
ICSID annulment committees have exhibited an enthusiasm for replac-
ing earlier tribunals' awards with their own legal reasoning. 64  Of the ten
annulment proceedings that have concluded, tribunals annulled the underly-
ing awards in six cases; 65 eight annulment proceedings are currently pend-
6o Michael D. Goldhaber, Wanted: A World Investment Court, Summer 2004, at
http://www.americanlawyer.com/focuseurope/investmentcourtO4.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2007).
61 See Knull, supra note 11 at 532.
62 International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes [ICSID], International Centre for Set-
tlement of Investment Disputes Convention, Regulations and Rules art. 52 (Oct. 14, 1966),
http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/basicdoc/CRREnglish-final.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2007).
63 ISCID Treaty art. 52. Rule 21.8.2.
64 Thomas Walde, ICSID 'Annulment Committee,' Transnational Dispute Management, February
2004, at 24, available at http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/samples/freearticles/
tvl-l-article_75.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2007).
65 See Amco Asia Corp.v. Indonesia, ICSID (W. Bank) ARB/81/l(1990); Kl6ckner Industrie-
Anlagen GmbH v. Cameroon, ICSID (W. Bank) ARB/81/2 (1985); Maritime Int'l Nominees Estab-
lishment v. Guinea, ICSID (W. Bank) ARB/84/4 (1989); Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Egypt, ICSID (W.
Bank) ARB/98/4 (2005); Consortium R.F.C.C. v. Morocco, ICSID (W. Bank) ARB/00/6 (2003);
CDC Group plc v. Seychelles, ICSID (W. Bank) ARB/02/14 (2005). It is significant that of the ten
concluded applications for annulment, two settled before the tribunal made a decision, and one claim
was withdrawn for lack of payment.. See Joy Mining Mach. Ltd. v. Egypt, ICSID (W. Bank)
ARB/03/11 (2004), S.Pac. Props. (Middle E.) Ltd, v. Egypt, ICSID (W. Bank) ARB/84/3 (1983); see
Gruslin v. Malaysia, (ICSID (W. Bank) ARB/99/3 (1999).
278
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ing.66 For example, in Compahia de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi
Universal v. Argentine Republic (Vivendi), the ICSID annulment committee
chose to displace the arbitral tribunal's theory of the case with its own.
67
Here, the tribunal determined that Claimants were required to exhaust local
remedies, though such exhaustion was not required by the BIT. 68 The an-
nulment committee, thereafter, ruled that the tribunal acted in excess of its
powers, as the BIT specifically permitted Claimants to take their grievances
to ICSID directly, without exhausting local remedies. 69 Here, the tribunals'
decision, and the resultant findings of the annulment committee highlight the
need for an appellate process within ICSID. If the actions of arbitrators will
effectively render the annulment process an appellate procedure, the rules of
investor-state arbitration should be updated to recognize the needs of parties
and the actions of arbitrators. The current means for review, the ICSID an-
nulment, is complicated by the fact that the annulment committee has the
power to remand decisions to the original arbitral tribunal, as in Vivendi.
This is contrary to most appeals procedures, where "the original judges will
often - for reasons of objectivity and impartiality - be no longer competent to
hear a case that was appealed on a higher level.
In recognition of these concerns, an ICSID appeals procedure was re-
cently under review. This revision, however, was not adopted and, in any
event, would have only applied to the ICSID Arbitration Rules, and not to
the Additional Facility Rules or investor-state arbitrations conducted outside
of ICSID.7"
66 CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina , ICSID (W. Bank)ARB/01/8 (2005); Mitchell v. De-
mocratic Republic of the Congo, ICSID (W. Bank) ARB/99/7 (2004); MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd.
v.Chile, ICSID (W. Bank) ARB/01/7 (2004); Repsol YPF Ecuador S.A. v. Empresa Estatal Petroleos
del Ecuador (Petroecuador), ICSID (W. Bank) ARB/01/10 (2005); Soufraki v. United Arab Emir-
ates, ICSID (W. Bank) ARB/02/7 (2004); Lucchetti v. Peru, ICSID (W. Bank) ARB/03/4 (2005).
67 See Compaiiia de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal v. Argentine Republic, ICSID
(W. Bank) ARB/97/3 (2002).
68 See Walde, supra note 64.
69 id.
70id.
71 ICSID, Additional Facility Rules, Introduction, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/facility/intro.htm
(last visited on April 1, 2006). The Additional Facility Rules authorize ICSID to:
[A]dminister certain categories of proceedings between States and nationals of other States that
fall outside the scope of the ICSID Convention. These are (i) fact-finding proceedings; (ii)
conciliation or arbitration proceedings for the settlement of investment disputes between par-
ties one of which is not a Contracting State or a national of a Contracting State; and (iii) con-
ciliation and arbitration proceedings between parties at least one of which is a Contracting
State or a national of a Contracting State for the settlement of disputes that do not arise directly
11
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NAFTA
In contrast to the ICSID annulment process, recourse against faulty
NAFTA awards lies within the courts of the nation where the arbitration was
72held. NAFTA is an international agreement between the United States,
Canada, and Mexico concerning trade, investment, and the provision of ser-
vices. The chief function of NAFTA is to "assist the North American region
in becoming more economically competitive with the rest of the world.
' 73
Chapter Eleven of NAFTA relates to the regulation of investment in the re-
gion; Section B contains the Chapter's dispute resolution mechanism.74
NAFTA's dispute resolution process works in multiple stages, providing
disputants first, with the opportunity to seek consultations to resolve their
disputes. If this step fails, parties may request that the Federal Trade
Commission convene to resolve the dispute promptly. 76 If parties are still
unable to reach an agreement at this stage, either party may request arbitra-
tion.7 7 After the arbitral process is completed and upon parties' receipt of
the final report, the disputing parties must agree on a resolution of their dis-
pute.
Parties must seek enforcement of NAFTA awards domestically.7 8
While the opportunity to seek either revision or annulment of the award does
exist under NAFTA, "Chapter Eleven itself is silent on challenges to panel
decisions. The possibility of 'appeal' remains subject to the rules of the rele-
vant arbitral regime and thus possibility of appeal varies from case to
case."
79
The NAFTA dispute resolution system provides no assurance of accu-
racy or consistency in the awards rendered. 80 Local judges, by and large, do
out of an investment, provided that the underlying transaction is not an ordinary commercial
transaction.
Consequently, international investment dispute arbitration, which significantly includes claims pur-
suant to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), will be left in the dust. Mexico,
Canada and the United States are parties to NAFTA. However, neither Mexico nor Canada are par-
ties to the Washington Convention. Therefore, NAFTA claims before ICSID must be administered
pursuant to the Additional Facility Rules.
72 NAFTA, U.S.-Can.-Mex., arts. 1115-38, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) (hereinafter
NAFTA).
73 Noemi Gal-Or, Private Party Direct Access: A Comparison of the NAFTA and the EU Disciplines,
21 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1,5 (1998).
74 NAFTA, supra note 72, at art. 1118.
75 id.
76 id.
77Id. at art. 1136.
78 id.
71 Gal-Or, supra note 73, at 30.
80 Goldhaber, supra note 60.
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not have the "experience with international law and arbitration doctrine" that
the arbitrators who unanimously rendered these awards typically possess.
81
Furthermore, judicial review of complex investor-state disputes is undesir-
able as it defeats NAFTA's basic goals of political neutrality and that dis-
putes are settled by seasoned arbitrators. 82 Thus, as shall be discussed be-
low, an Appeals Facility should be established to review investor-state
arbitral awards.
Effect of Insufficient Review of Investor-State Arbitration
The absence of an appeals process for investor-state disputes comes at a
very high price. At present, neither ICSID's annulment process nor the judi-
cial recourse afforded to NAFTA parties is comparable to, or as advanta-
geous as, an appellate process for international investment disputes. Parties'
attempts at including judicial appellate review provisions within arbitration
agreements are perceived as attempts at expanding the scope of treaties and
national laws which govern the recognition and enforcement of arbitral
awards. 83 Under these provisions, there are only limited grounds for refus-
ing to recognize and enforce arbitral awards, which mainly relate to proce-
dural mishaps. There is no mention of appellate processes.
The US Trade Promotion Authority Act "suggests that, when negotiat-
ing future investment treaties, the U.S. will consider an appellate body for
each treaty." 84  This concept was recently incorporated into the Central
85American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). CAFTA is an international
8' Coe, supra note 7, at 949.
82 Id.
83 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art. V, § 1, June 10,
1958, 7 I.L.M. 1046 [hereinafter New York Convention], provides that recognition and enforcement
of an award may be refused only if a party furnishes to the competent authority where the recogni-
tion and enforcement is sought, proof that: (a) the parties to the agreement were under some incapac-
ity; (b) the party against whom the award was invoked was not given proper notice of the appoint-
ment of an arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings; (c) the award contains a decision beyond the
scope of the arbitration; (d) the composition of the tribunal or the arbitral proceedings was not in
accordance with the parties agreement; or (e) the award has not yet become binding on the parties.
The Inter-American Convention on Intemational Commercial Arbitration, arts. 5(1)(e) and 6, June
16, 1976, 14 I.L.M. 336 [hereinafter Panama Convention], contains similar provisions acknowledg-
ing that such awards can only be vacated by the national courts where the award was made.
84 Franck, supra note 14, at 95.
85 CAFTA, Chapter 10, Annex 10-F (Aug. 2, 2005), http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade-Agreements/
Bilateral/CAFTA/CAFTA-DRFinalTexts/asset-upload-file328_4718.pdf (last visited Mar. 29,
2007), stating: "Within three months of the date of entry into force of this Agreement, the Commis-
sion shall establish a Negotiating Group to develop an appellate body or similar mechanism to re-
13
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agreement to help promote trade liberalization between the United States,
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and the Domini-
can Republic. s6 Chapter Ten, the agreement's investment chapter, provides
that disputes be resolved through binding arbitration; an annex to this chap-
ter calls for negotiations on the development of an appellate body to review
decisions rendered by CAFTA tribunals. 87
Further, the most recent US Model BIT offers that "[w]ithin three years
after the date of entry into force of this Treaty, the Parties shall consider
whether to establish a bilateral appellate body or similar mechanism to re-
view awards rendered."8 8 The US has also entered into bilateral investment
treaties with Singapore and Chile, each of which call for further negotiations
on the creation of an appeals process as a part of the agreement's dispute
resolution provisions.89
However, many commentators have pointed to the disadvantages in cre-
ating an appellate system for investor-state arbitration. Most of these con-
cerns relate to whether "an appeal would go against the principle of finality,
would bring additional delays, costs and caseload and lead to the politicisa-
tion [sic] of the system." 90  However, the absence of an appeal procedure
creates an environment which fosters prolonged litigation after awards are
issued. Losing parties are forced to submit grievances to state courts and to
try to neatly fit their grievances into some grounds for vacatur. 91 For exam-
ple, the current Argentinean investment treaty arbitration crisis illustrates the
view awards rendered by tribunals under this Chapter. Such appellate body or similar mechanism
shall be designed to provide coherence to the interpretation of investment provisions in the Agree-
ment." Id.86 id.
87 CAFTA, supra note 85, at Annex 10-FG; see also James L. Loftis & Adrianne L. Goins, Feature.
2005 Year In Review, International Law, 69 TEX. B.J. 45, 45-46 (2006).
8" 2004 Model BIT, Annex D, available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/38710.pdf
(last visited Mar. 29, 2007).
89 Coe, supra note 7, at 950-51; Chile FTA, U.S.-Chile, art. 10.19.10 (2003) available at
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/Chile-FTA/Final-Texts/Section-Index.html (last
visited Mar. 29, 2007); (Article 10.19.10 states that "If a separate multilateral agreement enters into
force as between the Parties that establishes an appellate body for purposes of reviewing awards ren-
dered by tribunals constituted pursuant to international trade or investment agreements to hear in-
vestment disputes, the Parties shall strive to reach an agreement that would have such appellate body
review awards rendered under art. 10.25 in arbitrations commenced after the appellate body's estab-
lishment."); Singapore FTA, U.S.-Singapore, art. 15.19.10 (2003), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade -Agreements/Bilateral/Singapore-FTA/Fina-Texts/asset-upload-f
ile708_4036.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2007).
90 KATIA YANNACA-SMALL, ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
IMPROVING THE SYSTEM OF INVESTOR-STATE SETTLEMENT: AN OVERVIEW 21 (2006).
91 Knull, supra note 11, at 542.
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need for an appellate process in investor-state arbitration. 92  As C. Ignacio
Suarez Anzorena noted in a May 2004 presentation before the Institute of
International and Comparative Law, current investment disputes relating to
Argentina's economic crisis of 2001 provide a recipe for disaster.
93
The looming possibility of Argentina losing in many, if not all, of the
approximately forty pending claims against it, in determinations to be made
by nearly thirty arbitrators, has forced the government to construct new and
creative defense strategies. 94 One such tactic has been an expansion of judi-
cial review of arbitral awards. 95  In a 2004 decision, the Federal Supreme
Court of Argentina held that "local courts could review an arbitral award
even when the parties involved have specifically agreed to waive the right of
appeal" to ensure that arbitral awards comply with Argentinean public pol-
icy and are constitutional, legal and rational. 96 It is probably no coincidence
that each of the ICSID claims pending against Argentina involves public
policy issues, namely, the country's decision in 2001 to devalue the peso
which resulted in the existing plethora of alleged BIT violations.97 Here, the
92 See Alfaro-Abogados, Argentina: ICSID Arbitration And BITs Challenged By the Argentine Gov-
ernment (December 21, 2004), available at http://www.alfarolaw.com/ima/tapa/alfaro3.htm (last
visited Mar. 29, 2007). Argentina's economic crisis resulted in the country's default on foreign debt.
Despite guarantees that the peso and the US dollar were of equal value, Argentina was later forced to
devalue the peso. The country's action had serious repercussions for investors. As many invest-
ments were made pursuant to BITs, which provided arbitration clauses, many investors brought
claims against Argentina before ICSID. Id.
13 C. lgnacio Suarez Anzorena, Appeals And Challenges To Investment Treay Awards: Is It Time
For An International Appellate System?, British Institute of International and Comparative Law,
Comment: Testing the Procedural Limits of the Treaty System: The Argentinean Experience (May 7,
2004), at http://www.biicl.org/admin/files/Ignacio%2OSuarez%20Presentation.pdf.
94 Alfaro-Abogados, supra note 92.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 See Compafiia de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal v. Argentine Republic, ICSID
(W. Bank) ARB/97/3 (2002); Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic,
ICSID (W. Bank) ARB/01/3 (2001); CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic,
ICSID (W. Bank) ARB/01/8 (2001); LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp. and LG&E Intema-
tional Inc. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) ARB/02/1 (2002); Azurix Corp. v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) ARB/01/12 (2001); Sempra Energy International v. Argentine Republic,
ICSID (W. Bank) ARB/02/16 (2002); AES Corporation v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank)
ARB/02/17 (2002); Camuzzi International S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) ARB/03/2
(2003); Metalpar S.A. and Buen Aire S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) ARB/03/5
(2003); Continental Casualty Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) ARB/03/9 (2003);
Gas Natural SDG, S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) ARB/03/10 (2003); Pan American
Energy LLC and BP Argentina Exploration Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank)
ARB/03/13 (2003); El Paso Energy International Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank)
ARB/03/15 (2003); Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and lnteragua Servicios
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possibility for inconsistent awards seems inevitable. ICSID's annulment
process is ill-equipped for reconciling any legal errors made in the nearly
forty Argentinean awards, especially considering that some of these cases
are outside of ICSID's jurisdiction. If parties are forced to take their claims
to Argentinean courts to consider their appeals, the opportunity for justice is
questionable, at best.
In addition, the ICSID annulment process does not provide parties with
a speedy or efficient course of action, characteristics so beloved of arbitra-
tion. Of the claims which have made it through the annulment process, it
took an average of five years for the ICSID arbitration process to finally
conclude. 98 Moreover, parties are not limited to one request for annulment,
heightening the inefficiency of the arbitration process. 99 The Secretary Gen-
eral of ICSID is permitted to consider any request for an annulment if it is
made, in accordance with Article 52(2) of the Convention, "within 120 days
after the date on which the award was rendered (or any subsequent decision
or correction)" or "in the case of corruption on the part of a member of the
Integrales de Agua S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) ARB/03/17 (2003); Suez, So-
ciedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentine Republic,
ICSID (W. Bank) ARB/03/19 (2003); Telef6nica S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank)
ARB/03/20 (2003); Enersis S.A. and others v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) ARB/03/21
(2003); Electricidad Argentina S.A. and EDF International S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W.
Bank) ARB/03/22 (2003); EDF International S.A., SAUR International S.A. and L6on Participa-
ciones Argentinas S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) ARB/03/23 (2003); Unisys Corpo-
ration v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) ARB/03/27 (2003); Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Re-
public, ICSID (W. Bank) ARB/03/30 (2003); Total S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank)
ARB/04/I (2004); SAUR International v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) ARB/04/4 (2004);
BP America Production Company and others v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) ARB/04/8
(2004); CIT Group Inc. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) ARB/04/9 (2004); Wintershall
Aktiengesellschaft v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) ARB/04/14 (2004); Mobil Exploration
and Development Inc. Suc. Argentina and Mobil Argentina S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W.
Bank) ARB/04/16 (2004); DaimlerChrysler Services AG v. Argentine Republic, ICSID (W. Bank)
ARB/05/1 (2005); Compafiia General de Electricidad S.A. and CGE Argentina S.A. v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID (W. Bank) ARB/05/2 (2005); TSA Spectrum de Argentina, S.A. v. Argentine Re-
public, ICSID (W. Bank) ARB/05/5 (2005); Asset Recovery Trust S.A. v. Argentine Republic,
ICSID (W. Bank) ARB/05/I 1 (2005).
98 See ICSID, List of Concluded Cases, at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/conclude.htm (last
visited on Mar. 20, 2006 (noting that: Amco was registered in 1981 and concluded in 1991, Kldckner
was registered in 1981 and concluded in 1988, Wena was registered in 1998 and concluded in 2004,
RFCC was registered in 2000 and concluded in 2004, and CDC was registered in 2002 and con-
cluded in 2005).
99 See Amco Asia Corp.v. Indonesia, ICSID (W. Bank) ARB/81/l(1990) (rejecting the parties' appli-
cations for annulment of the Award and annulling the Decision on Supplemental Decisions and Rec-
tification rendered on December 17, 1992). The Amco arbitration proceedings lasted just short of a
decade, after the second annulment award was issued. Kldckner was not concluded until a third tri-
bunal decided a second annulment application seven years after the original proceeding was regis-
tered with ICSID. Kldckner Industrie-Anlagen GmbH v. Cameroon , ICSID (W. Bank) ARB/81/2
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Tribunal, within 120 days after discovery thereof, and in any event within
three years after the date on which the award was rendered (or any subse-
quent decision or correction)."'' 00 The ICSID Annulment process could,
conceivably, last an eternity.
Fears that an appeals procedure would result in added costs and setbacks
in the arbitral process are unfounded. The average time period for annulling
an ICSID award is approximately five years,' 0' whereas, the average time
for an appeal before the WTO Appellate Body is three months. 102 Forcing
parties to continue within the current ICSID annulment process, or to take
their objections to state courts, has not cut costs or engendered a more effi-
cient practice. An appeals mechanism would remedy the inefficiencies of the
current process.
Recommendations for Providing Appellate Review of Investor-State
Arbitration
The establishment of a mechanism for appellate review of investor-state
arbitral awards is inevitable. Based on the fact that multiple treaties are con-
sidering the creation of appellate review instruments, it is likely that more
than one mechanism will be established. However, the creation of multiple
systems of review will intensify existing challenges of developing a consis-
tent body of jurisprudence and will have detrimental consequences for sta-
bility in this area of the law. 103 Whereas a "single, preferably institution-
ally-managed and widely-accepted" mechanism for reviewing investor-state
arbitral awards would be best suited to address the risk of "fragmentation of
the dispute settlement system that" might otherwise ensue. 0 4 Therefore, an
Appeals Facility should be introduced, separate and distinct from existing
arbitral institutions.
Such an institution could be founded by adding a protocol to existing
BITs and MITs.l0 5 By creating an Appeals Facility, independent of ICSID,
parties would not sacrifice finality, but instead ensure that awards would be
both final and passable. Such a procedure would not remove the finality or
' ICSID Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings, Chapter VII, Rule 50.
'o' ICSID, List of Concluded Cases, supra note 98.
102 WTO, supra note 27.
'03 OECD, Working Papers On International Investment, Improving The System Of Investor-State
Dispute Settlement: An Overview (2006), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
3/59/36052284.pdf.1
04Id.
105 Goldhaber, supra note 60.
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enforceability of awards. It would provide for an environment in which in-
vestors and States would be afforded recourse against awards where neces-
sary. While this might slightly prolong the arbitration, it would provide par-
ties with more confidence in the process.
Time limits could be set in place for this appellate procedure, similar to
those instituted by the WTO DSB. In this way, appellate processes would be
limited to a relatively short period of time, which would greatly alleviate the
burden currently placed on parties by the annulment process and judicial re-
view of awards. Further, the creation of a separate Appeals Facility will also
ease fears of subjecting ICSID to an increased case load. Here, the institu-
tion of a separate appellate mechanism will assist in developing a consistent
body of investor-state law and might actually lessen ICSID's docket as the
law, and parties' obligations, become clearer.
A single, permanent Appeals Facility "charged with interpreting the
network of investment treaties would more readily promote the creation of a
reliable, predictable and clear jurisprudence." 106 As this area of the law con-
tinues to develop and progress, an appellate mechanism will further enhance
the legitimacy of this system.
IV. INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE POSSIBILITY FOR
APPELLATE REVIEW
While investor-state disputes involve governments and foreign inves-
tors, international commercial disputes are a more private matter. Tradition-
ally, arbitration has been the favored means for settling international com-
mercial disputes as it provides parties with the ability to bypass foreign legal
systems, and the difficulties related to litigating in unfamiliar forums. More-
over, arbitration is driven by party autonomy: parties can elect arbitral insti-
tutions, arbitrators and rules which are particularly suited to their needs.
Awards are usually confidential and enforcement is guaranteed under inter-
national law.
Nonetheless, most parties are precluded from requesting institutional re-
view, or appeal, of international commercial arbitral awards. US courts, for
example, have held that private parties cannot alter the judicial process by
imposing "on the federal courts a broader standard of review than the
grounds authorized by" the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).10 7 The grounds
for judicial review of arbitral awards have been extremely limited in order to
"preserve due process but not to permit unnecessary public intrusion into
106 Franck, supra note 14, at 95.
107 Kyocera Corp. v. Prudential-Bache Trade Servs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 997 (9th Cir. 2003) (empha-
sis added); see also Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 933 (10th Cir. 2001).
286
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private arbitration procedures."' 0 8 Courts have rightly reasoned that they
should not interfere with contract-based arbitral proceedings. But to further
enhance the efficiency and accuracy of this process, and in the interests of
party autonomy, arbitral institutions can implement appellate processes for
review of international commercial arbitration awards.
The increased incorporation of appellate mechanisms within interna-
tional commercial arbitration rules will assist in creating "a new area of
growth" in "the use of ADR by large corporations otherwise unwilling to
'bet the farm' on a single tribunal's decision." 09 Such systemic transforma-
tion, properly assembled, will enhance the capacity of international commer-
cial arbitration.
Existing Appellate Mechanisms for Review of International Commercial
Awards
The only recourse that most parties are afforded for faulty international
arbitration awards lies within a national court at the place of arbitration.
However, the "fact that the New York Convention does not specify the con-
trolling grounds for vacating a non-domestic award would tend to suggest
that there exists a dramatic lack of uniformity in the standards national
courts apply when determining whether to vacate such an award." " 0
Depending upon the place of arbitration, various methods of post-award
review may be available. While appellate mechanisms are in place for do-
mestic arbitration within the US, these methods do not seem to be utilized in
international commercial arbitral proceedings. As discussed below, arbitra-
tion institutions in the US, Great Britain and China rely upon institutional
scrutiny of awards, a process that bears no resemblance to an appeal."'
However, Austrian, South African and French arbitration law does provide
for appellate review of international commercial awards. 112 Appellate sys-
tems, similar to those discussed below, should be made more available
within international commercial disputes to promote the efficiency and reli-
ability of international arbitration.
'08 Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 998.
00 Knull, supra note 11, at 535.
Id. at 547.
See infra notes 116-30 and accompanying text.
"12 See infra notes 131-41 and accompanying text.
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Domestic Appeals Processes
In contrast to US opinions of appellate processes for international arbi-
tration, 113 these mechanisms do exist in the domestic arbitration realm. In
1999, the International Institute for Conflict Prevention & Resolution (CPR)
became the first major private commercial arbitration institution to establish
separate, optional rules governing appeals procedures, though these rules
have, thus far, only applied to domestic arbitrations conducted in the US. 114
CPR asserts that "a well structured private appeal to a highly qualified tribu-
nal is likely to be preferable to seeking judicial review with all the attendant
uncertainties."' 115 Moreover, the lack of an arbitral appellate process often
convinces "parties in larger cases to opt for a panel of three arbitrators, re-
sulting in substantial additional cost and often delay. If parties have the
safeguard of an appeal, they may see less need for three arbitrators." 116 Fur-
thermore, an internal appeals mechanism may also deter the losing party
from seeking "review in court even on statutory grounds."117
There are no arbitration providers within the U.S. who offer appellate
mechanisms for international commercial arbitration, though optional do-
mestic appeal processes are available. This distinction is erroneous. To
date, the case law foreclosing parties' ability to contract for expanded review
of arbitral awards relates to "judicial" review of such awards. Moreover,
such provisions are not foreclosed by the New York or Panama Conven-
tions. Under the New York Convention, each contracting State is obli-
gated to "recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in accor-
dance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied
upon." In the US, arbitral institutions readily provide parties to domestic
arbitration with the opportunity to participate in an appellate process. Insti-
tutional appellate practice is made in accordance with US law for domestic
arbitration. Therefore, internal appellate review of international awards
should also be offered in institutional rules.
113 Kyocera, 341 F.3d at 987; see also van Ginkel, supra note 9.
114 Int'l Inst. for Conflict Prevention & Resolution, Revision History, http://www.cpradr.org/
arbappeal-revhist.asp?M=9.2.3.2 (last visited Mar. 27, 2007); Knull, supra note 11, at 555.
..5 Int'l Inst. for Conflict Prevention & Resolution, Commentary, http://www.cpradr.org/
arb-appeal-commentary.asp? (last visited Mar. 27, 2007).
16 Int'l Inst. For Conflict Prevention & Resolution, Rationale, http://www.cpradr.org/
arb-appeal-rationale.asp?M=9.2.3.6 (last visited Mar. 6, 2007).
117 Id.
118 See generally Kyocera, 341 F.3d 987; Bowen, 254 F.3d 925.
"9 New York Convention, supra note 83, at art. 111; Panama Convention, supra note 83, at art.
5(l)(e).
120 New York Convention, supra note 83, at art. I1.
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The New York Convention further provides that recognition or en-
forcement of an award may be refused if the "award has not yet become
binding on the parties, or has been set aside or suspended."' 121 It is therefore
possible to construct an appellate process, within arbitral institutions, which
comports with the requirements of the Convention. For example, where par-
ties opt to participate in an appellate process, such an award should not be
deemed binding by the institution until (1) parties have communicated they
do not wish to file a request for appeal; (2) the award, on appeal, has been
rendered; or (3) the time period for requesting appellate review has
elapsed. 122 In this way, the advantage in the finality of arbitral awards is
preserved and the final, binding decision is enforceable under the Conven-
tion.
Institutional Scrutiny of Awards
Nevertheless, most arbitral awards cannot be appealed according to in-
stitutional rules, though some arbitral institutions have introduced methods
for keeping arbitrators to some discipline. 123 The International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC), Judicial Arbitration & Mediation Services, Inc. (JAMS)
and the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission
(CIETAC) rules for international arbitration provide that awards must be
subjected to some scrutiny before they are finalized. As an example, the
ICC Rules state that the
Court may lay down modifications as to the form of the Award and,
without affecting the Arbitral Tribunal's liberty of decision, may also draw
its attention to points of substance. No Award shall be rendered by the Arbi-
tral Tribunal until it has been approved by the Court as to its form.
However, conditions such as this do not obligate the tribunal to
change its award. The rules make clear that any suggestions made should
121 id.
122 See ICC, supra note 10; CIETAC, supra note 10; JAMS International Arbitration Rules, supra
note 10.
123 Walde, supra note 64.
124 ICC, supra note 10 (provides for scrutiny of the Award by the Court (emphasis added)); see also
CIETAC, supra note 10 (which states that "[tlhe arbitral tribunal shall submit its draft award to the
CIETAC for scrutiny before signing the award. The CIETAC may remind the arbitral tribunal of
issues in the award on condition that the arbitral tribunal's independence in rendering the award is
not affected."); see also JAMS, supra note 10 (which provides that "Before signing any Award, the
Tribunal will submit it in draft to JAMS. JAMS may suggest modifications as to the form of the
Award and may also draw the Tribunal's attention to points of substance. No Award will be ren-
dered by the Tribunal until it has been approved by JAMS as to its form.").
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not "affect the Arbitral Tribunal's liberty of decision" or "independence in
rendering the award."
' 125
It is doubtful that these processes are capable of ensuring that awards
"accurately [restate] the substance of any evidence identified in the award,
or accurately [describe] every aspect of applicable law that is referenced in
the award." 26 Moreover, neither procedure allows for a party-driven appel-
late process, as parties have no role in the ICC, JAMS or CIETAC scrutiny
of an award. 1
27
Institutional Appellate Review
Institutional appellate review processes have, however, been created in
some jurisdictions and in varying forms. 128  As discussed in this section,
South African, Austrian and French arbitral institutions each offer optional
appeal procedures for parties to international commercial disputes. In
both Austria and South Africa, arbitral awards are final and binding unless
the parties have agreed to the possibility of an appeal against the award. 1
30
In Austria, appeals are referred to a second-tier arbitral body, 13 1 while par-
ties to an arbitration agreement in South Africa may elect to have an award
reviewed by either another arbitral tribunal or to the High Court for adjudi-
cation. 132
The Paris Arbitration Chamber (PAC), founded more than seventy years
ago, has overseen approximately twenty-five thousand arbitrations; more
than half of the disputes referred to PAC are international. 133 The rules of
125 ICC, supra note 10.
126 James M. Gaitis, International and Domestic Arbitration Procedure: The Need for a Rule Provid-
ing a Limited Opportunity for Arbitral Reconsideration of Reasoned Awards, 15 AM. REV. INT'L
ARB. 9, 25 (2004).
121 See ICC, supra note 10; CIETAC, supra note 10; and JAMS, supra note 10.
128 See Zivilprozessordnung [ZPO] [Civil Procedure Statute] 1984, as amended, § 594 (Austria),
available at http://www.arbitration-austria.at/documents/ZPO-Engl.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2007);
see also Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 s. 28 (South Africa), available at http://www.arbitrators.co.za/
arbsnew/arbact42-65.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2007); Chambre Arbitrale de Paris, General Presen-
tation, http://www.arbitrage.org/us/Proceedings/reglement-us-2005.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2007).
129 Id.
"' Austrian Code of Civil Procedure, art. 594, available at http://www.arbitration-
austria.at/documents/ZPO-Engl.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2007); South African Arbitration Act 42 of
1965, § 28, available at http://www.arbitrators.co.za/arbsnew/arbact42-65.htm# 23_Time-for (last
visited Apr. 15, 2007).
... Austrian Code of Civil Procedure, supra note 130, at art. 594.
132 The Arbitration Foundation for South Africa, Commercial Rules for Arbitration, art. 12.10, avail-
able at http://www.arbitration.co.za/Pages/docs/commercial-rules.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2007).
133 Chamber Arbitrale de Paris, General Presentation 3, http://www.arbitrage.org/
us/Presentation/us-presentation-cap.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2007) [hereinafter PAC]. Foreign en-
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the PAC provide for a two-tier procedure. 34 After a provisional award is
rendered by the arbitral tribunal in the first stage of the proceedings, a party
may request that the case be heard by a second panel before a final award is
rendered. 135 In the next stage of the proceedings the second tribunal will
hear the case again and then render a final award. 136
This review process is also conducted in a cost efficient and timely
manner. The PAC estimates that arbitration proceedings can last from three
to five months, depending on the conscientiousness of the parties and the
complexity of dispute.137 The finality of the arbitral process is preserved as
awards of the second panel are final and binding. 138 Thus, the PAC is able
to provide disputants with an effective means for ensuring the issuance of
precise awards and to recognize parties' interests in crafting an arbitration
process to suit their needs.
Recommendations for Providing Appellate Review of International
Commercial Arbitration
Accordingly, parties to international commercial arbitration should be
provided with the option of appellate review within the arbitral institution
where they have filed their claim. Arbitral institutions should provide op-
tional recourse for disputed awards, and not force parties to transfer their
claims to the judicial system. According to this scheme, parties should agree
to an institution's internal rules for the optional appeal of international
commercial awards.139 Both parties should be empowered to appeal a pro-
visional award, rendered pursuant to the institution's applicable arbitration
rules.
terprises are parties to fifty-five percent of arbitration procedures before the PAC and two foreign
parties are in dispute in fifteen to twenty percent of the institution's cases. Id. at 5.




131 PAC, supra note 133, at 2.
131 See JAMS Optional Arbitration Appeal Procedure, http://www.jamsadr.com/rules/optional.asp
(last visited Mar. 29, 2007); see also the Rules of Procedure of the Arbitration Chamber of Paris,
http://www.arbitrage.org/us/Proceedings/US-Reglement-mediation.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2007;
WTO Working Procedures for Appellate Review, at
http://www.wto.org/enlish/tratop-e/dispue/ab-e.htm#24 (last visited Mar. 29, 2007).
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Initially, the appeal may be commenced once a written Notice of appeal
("Notice") has been served on the institution by the appellant. 140 Upon the
filing of a Notice, the institution will recommend an appeal panel to the par-
ties and make any applicable disclosures regarding the candidates for the
panel. The institution will seek the agreement of the parties as to the selec-
tion of the appeal panel members; if the parties do not agree on the composi-
tion of the appeal panel within seven (7) calendar days of having received
the institution's recommendation, the institution will appoint an appeal
panel. 141
Within seven calendar days of the service of the Notice, the party(ies)
must serve on the institution, and on the opposing party(ies), a written sub-
mission. 142 Any party to the dispute that wishes to respond to allegations
raised in an appellant's submission may, within twenty-five days after the
date of the filing of the Notice, file with the institution, and serve a copy on
the appellant, a written submission. 1
43
Thereafter, the appeal panel shall hold an oral hearing within forty five
days of the filing of the Notice, if all parties request such argument. 
144
Thereafter, the Provisional Award shall become null and void once the for-
malities for the appeal have been carried out within the stipulated time
limit. 145 The award of the appeal panel shall be issued on the basis of a ma-
jority vote. 146 It shall include the names of the Arbitrators and parties, a
concise summary of the cases of the parties, their respective arguments and
140 WTO Working Procedures for Appellate Review, supra note 139. This Notice should include: (1)
the title of the arbitral proceedings under appeal; (2) the name of appellant; (3) the service addresses,
telephone and facsimile numbers of the parties to the dispute; and (4) a statement of the nature of the
appeal, which includes a summary of the alleged errors in the issues of law covered in the Provi-
sional Award and legal interpretations developed by the arbitrator(s).
141 JAMS Optional Arbitration Appeal Procedure, supra note 139. An Appeal Panel will consist of
three neutral members, unless the Parties agree that there will be one neutral member. An arbitrator,
or member of the tribunal, sitting on the bench of the first arbitration should not serve as Arbitrator
on the Appeal Panel.
142 The appellant's submission must contain: (1) a precise statement of the grounds for the appeal,
including the specific allegations of errors in the issues of law covered in the Provisional Award and
legal interpretations developed by the panel, and the legal arguments in support thereof; (2) a precise
statement of the provisions of the covered agreements and other legal sources relied on; and (3) the
nature of the decision or ruling sought.
143 JAMS Optional Arbitration Appeal Procedure, supra note 139; WTO Working Procedures, supra
note 139. The appellee's submission must contain: (1) a precise statement of the grounds for oppos-
ing the appellant's submission, and the legal arguments in support thereof; (2) a precise statement of
the provisions of the covered agreements and other legal sources relied on; and (3) the nature of the
decision or ruling sought.
14 WTO Working Procedures, supra note 139. All fees for the original arbitration must be paid in
full before an appeal will be scheduled.
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the given facts, the reasons for the award reached and a statement of the
fines. 147 This Award shall be final and binding.
Such a process will obviate the need for applying to unpredictable State
courts for assistance and will enhance the legitimacy of international com-
mercial arbitration by reinforcing its commitment to the principals of party
autonomy, efficiency and finality.
V. CONCLUSION
As is true within judicial proceedings, arbitral awards are sometimes
based on misapplications of law or misconstruing of objective evidence. 148
Even arbitrators may be fallible. If parties wish to safeguard against such
human frailties, they should be allowed to do so.
Current methods for review of both investor-state and international
commercial arbitral awards are inadequate for providing parties with effec-
tive review mechanisms for faulty awards. An appellate system should be
readily available to parties who opt to participate in this process. The crea-
tion of a stand-alone appeals facility for reviewing investor-state disputes
would aid in promoting a cohesive and consistent body of law. Further, the
adoption of appeals procedures for international commercial disputes at an
institutional level would enhance the efficiency of international commercial
arbitration. To encourage the finality, efficiency and enforceability of inter-
national arbitral awards, such appellate processes must be recognized.
147 Id.
148 Gaitis, supra note 126, at 97.
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